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Synchronization-Reduced Waveform Design for Jam-Resistant Wireless Communication

IoT Security Master Thesis Kirchberg Campus

Overview

Modern wireless communication systems dedicate 15-30% of transmission resources to synchronization overhead: preambles, pilot symbols, training sequences, and guard intervals. Beyond inefficiency, these predictable structures create a critical security vulnerability. Smart jammers specifically target synchronization sequences because disrupting timing acquisition is far more effective than trying to overpower the entire signal.

Emerging precision timing technologies, particularly Chip-Scale Atomic Clocks (CSACs), offer an intriguing possibility: if transmitter and receiver maintain independent, highly stable time references, how much synchronization overhead can we eliminate? And what are the security implications of removing predictable synchronization patterns from the waveform?

This thesis conducts a systematic feasibility study exploring synchronization-reduced waveform design. The student will characterize realistic timing impairments (clock drift, jitter, temperature effects), quantify achievable overhead reduction for different waveform families (OFDM, DSSS, frequency hopping), and analyze the resulting jam resistance improvement. The work establishes theoretical foundations and simulation-based validation to inform hardware implementations.

Requirements

Background in wireless communications (OFDM, modulation schemes).
Signal processing fundamentals.
Programming skills in MATLAB or Python.
Interest in physical-layer security.
Basic understanding of timing and synchronization concepts.

Expected Outcomes

Comprehensive analysis of synchronization overhead in modern waveforms.
Realistic timing impairment models for precision oscillators.
Synchronization-reduced waveform design with simulation validation.
Quantified trade-off between timing precision and achievable overhead reduction.
Preliminary jam resistance analysis informing hardware development.
High potential for publication at IEEE S&P, USENIX Security, or IEEE TIFS.

References

J. Kitching, “Chip-scale atomic devices,” Applied Physics Reviews, 2018.
D. Torrieri, “Principles of Spread-Spectrum Communication Systems,” Springer, 2018.
M. Lichtman et al., “A Communications Jamming Taxonomy,” IEEE Security & Privacy, 2016.
K. Bauer et al., “Physical Layer Attacks on Unlinkability in Wireless LANs,” Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2012.